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INTRODUCTION 
nformation stored in a physical object receives the same Fourth 
Amendment protection as the physical object in which it is stored.1  
As information moves online, it becomes independent of physical 
objects, and therefore traditional rules must be reexamined.  Others 
have argued persuasively,2 and courts appear receptive to the 
argument,3 that online communications and data should receive the 
same protection as their analogs embodied in the physical world.  
Even assuming that this conclusion will be universally accepted, a 
troubling consequence remains: the clear weight of authority holds 
that Fourth Amendment protection does not apply to information 
embodied in discarded physical trash.4  If this rule for discarded 
physical trash translates into cyberspace, then even if online 
communications and data are protected, “cybertrash”—deleted e-
mails and other files—is not protected. 
 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence 
and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (2005). 
2 See, e.g., David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth 
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 2205 (2009); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic 
Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557 (2004). 
3 E.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2010); In re United 
States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Or. 2009). 
4 While Couillard and Mulligan conclude that undeleted files are protected, Couillard, 
supra note 2; Mulligan, supra note 2, “undiscarded trash” is also protected, but loses its 
protection when discarded, see infra Part II. 
I
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This Article begins with a summary of the development of Fourth 
Amendment theory and the evolution of its theoretical basis from 
protection of property against physical trespass to protection of 
individuals against violations of their expectation of privacy.5  The 
Article then analyzes the application of theory to the special case of 
physical trash.6  The Article next explores what is meant by trash by 
looking at the broader context of disposal of physical materials and 
comparing various legal models for rights in discarded materials.7  
Finally, the Article evaluates the models and concludes that 
cybertrash is fundamentally different from physical trash and should 
be accorded Fourth Amendment protection notwithstanding the denial 
of such protection for physical trash.8 
I 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment is, of course, the starting point for any 
analysis of protection against search and seizure.  It provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.9 
The theory underlying the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment has evolved,10 running from a literal reading 
applying the Fourth Amendment to “persons, houses,11 papers, and 
 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states by virtue 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 (1961) (“[E]vidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution 
is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”). 
10 For a detailed analysis of the development of Fourth Amendment interpretation, see 
Madeline A. Herdrich, Note, California v. Greenwood: The Trashing of Privacy, 38 AM. 
U. L. REV. 993 (1989).  For an analysis of the confusion caused by the Supreme Court’s 
different tests, see David P. Miraldi, Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and 
Fourth Amendment Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 709 (1977). 
11 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (denying protection to open fields); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (denying protection to telephone lines 
running to a house). 
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effects” to an expectation of privacy test.12  Running throughout this 
evolution is the common thread of protection of privacy and dignity 
interests against arbitrary and invasive acts by the government.13  
However, the meaning of “invasive” has historically evolved in 
response to technological advances, and technological changes have 
been dramatic since the Supreme Court’s most recent venture into 
Fourth Amendment theory.14 
A.  The Physical Trespass Theory 
Early Fourth Amendment cases were property based and held that 
the Fourth Amendment only prohibited searches that involved a 
common-law trespass by government officials.15  A corollary, the 
“open fields” doctrine, which was applied in Hester v. United 
States,16 was based on a reading of the Fourth Amendment as literally 
limited to people, houses, papers, and effects, and not to open fields 
beyond the home.17  This reading relied on the common-law 
distinction between “curtilage,” which had been “traditionally defined 
as the protected area immediately surrounding the home, into which 
[the] intimate activities [of the home were] extended,” and “open 
fields,” which implicated more relaxed rules of trespass.18 
The Supreme Court did not perceive defining the limits of the 
curtilage as difficult.  In Oliver v. United States, the Court noted: 
 
12 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (“[A] fundamental purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions 
of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of 
the home.” (footnote omitted)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) 
(“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even 
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” (citation omitted)). 
13 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
14 The most recent detailed exploration of Fourth Amendment theory was in the 1967 
case, Katz, 389 U.S. at 349–59, discussed infra Part I.C. 
15 Hester, 265 U.S. at 59; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942) 
(noting that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to open fields but does extend 
to the area immediately surrounding the home). 
16 265 U.S. at 59. 
17 William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional 
Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 828–29 (2000). 
18 Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine 
to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 297, 299 (2005). 
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Most of the many millions of acres that are “open fields” are not 
close to any structure and so not arguably within the curtilage.  And, 
for most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly 
marked; and the conception defining the curtilage—as the area 
around the home to which the activity of home life extends—is a 
familiar one easily understood from our daily experience.19 
The Court offered the following refinement of the curtilage definition 
in United States v. Dunn: the area that “is so intimately tied to the 
home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”20  The definition is, of course, 
circular; defining the curtilage as that area protected by the Fourth 
Amendment is less than helpful in answering the question of whether 
the Fourth Amendment applies.  The Court did, however, list four 
factors for determining whether an area was within the curtilage: (1) 
proximity to the home, (2) whether the area was within an enclosure 
surrounding the home, (3) the uses to which the area was put, and (4) 
the steps taken to protect the area from observation by passersby.21 
The Oliver and Dunn decisions predate the World Wide Web,22 so 
it is not surprising that the “familiar” conception of curtilage 
supposed in those cases breaks down when applied to cyberspace23 
and that the four Dunn factors do not translate well to analysis of 
cyberspace. 
 
19 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984). 
20 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
21 Id. at 302–03.  For an analysis of the difficulty of applying the concept of curtilage to 
high-density urban locations, see Leonetti, supra note 18. 
22 A November 12, 1990, internal CERN (the European Organization for Nuclear 
Research) memo from Tim Berners-Lee of its Computing and Network Division and R. 
Cailliau of its Electronics and Computing for Physics Division is widely regarded as the 
blueprint for what would become the World Wide Web.  See T. Berners-Lee & R. Cailliau, 
WorldWideWeb: Proposal for a HyperText Project, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, 
http://www.w3.org/Proposal.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).  The predecessor of the 
Internet (Arpanet) already existed but was not widely available.  Even the CERN plan for 
the World Wide Web was, at that stage, limited: “The project will not aim . . . to do 
research into fancy multimedia facilities such as sound and video.”  Id.  The first use of the 
term “World Wide Web” occurred in October 1990.  Dan Connolly, A Little History of the 
World Wide Web, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/History.html (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
23 The Court had, of course, dealt with electronic extensions of the home in wiretapping 
cases.  See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
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In addition, an aspect of general trespass law is the principle that 
there can be no trespass against abandoned property,24 an aspect that 
features critically in the trash cases discussed below.25  In the 
physical world, abandonment requires “both [the] owner’s intent to 
abandon . . . property and . . . some affirmative act or omission 
demonstrating that intention.”26  The more challenging of these two 
requirements is the finding of intent to abandon,27 a challenge that is 
especially difficult in cyberspace. 
B.  Relaxation of the Physical Trespass Requirement 
The transition of Fourth Amendment theory from trespass to 
expectation of privacy began with the recognition that a narrow view 
of what constituted a trespass translated into a broad scope for 
warrantless searches. 
In Silverman v. United States, the traditional requirement of a 
physical trespass to trigger Fourth Amendment protection was relaxed 
in response to technological advances.28  Police had obtained 
evidence by using an electronic listening device.29  The Court found 
no physical trespass but invalidated the search as an intrusion on a 
constitutionally protected area.30  The approach is similar in theory to 
that taken in United States v. Dunn, which, while involving physical 
space, used language broadly defining curtilage as the area within 
which “intimate activity associated with ‘the sanctity of a man’s home 
and the privacies of life’” takes place.31 
 
24 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (upholding the warrantless seizure of 
whiskey bottles dropped by the defendant during a police chase because the bottles were 
abandoned). 
25 See infra Part II. 
26 Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1138 (2d Cir. 1991). 
27 Although intent may be inferred if supported by facts, Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 
U.S. 580, 597–98 (1911), it may also be defeated by facts showing that surrender of 
possession was not accompanied by an intention to give up ownership, Saxlehner v. Eisner 
& Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19, 34–35 (1900). 
28 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961). 
29 Id. at 506. 
30 Id. at 511–12. 
31 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)); see also supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.  The core 
language of “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” was taken from Boyd 
v. United States, 166 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).  Courts have also recognized Fourth 
Amendment protection in common areas within apartment complexes, hotels, and motels.  
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Had the evolution of Fourth Amendment theory stopped there it 
would be tempting to argue that the protected area of curtilage 
extends beyond physical space.  Under this view, the rise of cloud 
computing32 could be seen as extending the traditional protection of 
the physical home into cyberspace.  David Couillard advances the 
theoretical underpinning for recognition of this “virtual curtilage”: 
Modern Internet users enjoy access to digital calendars, 
photographs, address books, correspondence in the form of e-mail 
messages, and diaries in the form of personal blogs.  Such a list of 
items may sound familiar—it includes the same materials deemed 
“highly personal” by the Supreme Court . . . . The fact that such 
items are digital rather than physical should not change their status 
as highly personal objects . . . .33 
This status, Couillard argues, is sufficient to bring at least certain 
Internet activities within the curtilage, which, before Katz v. United 
States, would establish Fourth Amendment protection and, under 
Katz, would be at least a factor supporting protection.34 
However, while the transitional case of Silverman and its progeny 
still referred to concepts of trespass within the curtilage, the 
connection became strained in later cases in the face of technological 
advances that blurred the notions of trespass, the curtilage, and 
physical reality itself.  The strain ultimately became too great in Katz, 
which abandoned the requirement of physical trespass theory as a 
prerequisite to invoking Fourth Amendment protection and replaced it 
with the current expectation of privacy test.35 
 
See, e.g., United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716–17 (9th Cir. 1976) (common hallway 
of an apartment building); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(common area of an apartment building); Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 
1974) (fenced yard of a multiunit apartment building).  But see United States v. Holland, 
755 F.2d 253, 255–56 (2d Cir. 1985) (no expectation of privacy in common hallway or 
lobby of an apartment building). 
32 The term “cloud computing” arises from the use of a cloud icon as a symbol for the 
Internet in flow charts.  It refers to a system in which data and software are stored 
remotely and accessed through the Internet rather than being located on the user’s 
computer.  Google’s Gmail service is an example of a widely used cloud-computing 
application.  See infra Part III.A.4. 
33 Couillard, supra note 2, at 2219–20 (footnotes omitted). 
34 Id. at 2220. 
35 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 360 (1967).  Trespass may still be relevant 
to the determination of the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy under the current 
Katz test.  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 (“The existence of a property right is but one element in 
determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate.”).  For an example of 
application by lower courts, see United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 546 (4th Cir. 
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C.  The Expectation of Privacy Theory 
The expectation of privacy analysis was explicitly decoupled from 
the concept of trespass within the curtilage in Katz v. United States.36  
In Katz, the area searched was nowhere near the defendant’s home 
and was not owned by the defendant—the challenged evidence was 
obtained by wiretapping a public telephone booth.37  The Court held 
the evidence improperly obtained because “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places”38 and what an individual “seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected,” noting that the defendant had sought to 
exclude “the uninvited ear.”39 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion is frequently cited as the 
clearer statement of the holding of the case: “My understanding of the 
rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
 
2005) (“[T]he proper test for abandonment is not whether all formal property rights have 
been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the [property] alleged to be abandoned.  In making that determination, however, 
it is still relevant to consider a defendant’s property interest.” (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  For a further discussion of Katz and the 
expectation of privacy theory, see infra Part II. 
36 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.  For a detailed analysis of Katz and cases interpreting Katz, see 
Herdrich, supra note 10, at 1000–06.  For attempts to distill guidance from Katz, see James 
A. Bush & Rece Bly, Note, Expectation of Privacy Analysis and Warrantless Trash 
Reconnaissance After Katz v. United States, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 287–88 (1981) 
(identifying seven Katz factors: (1) defendant’s own conduct, (2) strength of physical 
barriers, (3) number of people with access, (4) number of people outside enclosure, (5) 
social inhibitions, (6) sensory enhancing, and (7) defendant’s control of enclosure), and 
Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging 
Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1987) (identifying three Katz factors: 
(1) place of intrusion, (2) nature and degree of intrusion, and (3) object of surveillance); cf. 
Rosemarie Falcone, Note, California v. Ciraolo: The Demise of Private Property, 47 LA. 
L. REV. 1365, 1371 (1987) (concluding that Katz provides no clear guidance). 
37 389 U.S. at 348. 
38 Id. at 351.  Concurring, Justice Harlan stated: 
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed 
telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as 
well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally 
protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively 
unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant. 
Id. at 360–61 (citations omitted).  Justice Harlan’s concurrence was ultimately adopted by 
the Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
39 Id. at 351–52. 
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requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”40 
Not surprisingly, the focus in subsequent cases applying this two-
pronged expectation of privacy test has tended to lie on the second, 
more objective prong of determining what society is willing to 
respect.41 
In Oliver v. United States, police recovered marijuana plants from 
an open field on which the defendant had posted a “No Trespassing” 
sign.42  Under the classic trespass cases, the sign would have been 
irrelevant—a search of open fields would have been viewed as 
permissible.  The Oliver Court reached the same conclusion, but 
found it necessary to consider the effect of the “No Trespassing” sign.  
Although recognizing that the sign evidenced the defendant’s 
personal desire for privacy, the Court held that society in general did 
not recognize the privacy of open fields and therefore a warrantless 
search was not improper.43 
The expectation of privacy theory recognizes a special case 
comparable to the trespass theory’s special case for abandoned 
property: voluntarily44 conveying information to a third party 
 
40 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984); 
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. 
41 The very subjectivity of the first prong and the unique “ownership” of proof (the 
person asserting a Fourth Amendment right could always claim to have had an expectation 
of privacy, and proof of a contrary mental state would be difficult) make it a less useful 
test than the second prong.  However, this emphasis on the second prong is not without its 
critics.  Professor LaFave argues that “[i]t would be a perversion of Katz to interpret it as 
extending protection only to those who resort to extraordinary means to keep information 
regarding their personal lives out of the hands of the police.”  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.6(c) (4th ed. 2004).  
Professor LaFave further argues that in the cyberworld “password protection, and perhaps 
encryption of data should be no less reasonable than reliance upon locks, bolts, and burglar 
alarms, even though each form of protection is penetrable.”  Id. § 2.6(f) (quoting Randolph 
S. Sergent, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 1181, 1200 (1995)).  That view has been accepted by at least one lower court.  See 
United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121–23 (D. Mass. 2007). 
42 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984). 
43 Id. at 176–81. 
44 At least one district court has taken an expansive view of “voluntary.”  In United 
States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Or. 2006), the court found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in home energy usage because the homeowner “voluntarily” 
conveyed this information to the utility company by merely using the electricity. 
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surrenders any expectation of privacy in the information.45  Thus, if a 
person voluntarily conveys information to a third party, the 
government can obtain this information from the third party without 
violating the conveying party’s privacy interests.46  The Supreme 
Court upheld the use of pen registers to record outgoing telephone 
numbers in Smith v. Maryland, because the telephone user 
“voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone 
company,” exposing the information to the phone company’s 
equipment.47  A district court has applied similar reasoning to 
conclude that a homeowner had no reasonable privacy expectation in 
his or her home energy usage records because the homeowner 
voluntarily conveyed this information to the utility company by 
merely using the electricity.48  Similar reasoning also led the Ninth 
Circuit to find no expectation of privacy in the address fields of e-
mails.49 
The issue of voluntary conveyance features prominently in the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to trash. 
 
45 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“[W]hen an individual reveals 
private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that 
information to the authorities . . . . Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy 
occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate 
information.”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (noting that a bank 
customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in records he voluntarily conveys to the 
bank, such as deposit slips, because “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government”). 
46 Even if the government obtains the information by violating the third party’s privacy 
interests, the person conveying the information has no standing to assert the third party’s 
claim.  See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Kerr, supra note 1, at 293–94. 
47 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its 
equipment in the ordinary course of business.  In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that 
the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”). 
48 Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (rejecting an argument that electricity use records 
revealed intimate facts about the home, making the action a search under Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)). 
49 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2008).  The Ninth Circuit 
found an expectation of privacy in the content of text messages.  Quon v. Arch Wireless 
Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 2008).  One reading that reconciles these cases 
is that content remains protected while the address information, analogous to an envelope, 
is open to the public and not protected. 
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II 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF TRASH 
Trash has proven difficult to fit into Fourth Amendment analysis.50  
While the Fourth Amendment protects property within the curtilage, 
and trash is typically placed at the edge of the curtilage in a container 
protecting it from public view (suggesting protection under a 
protected area analysis), it is also left with the expectation that a third 
party will take possession of it, thereby calling into question the 
reasonableness of any expectation of privacy. 
The Supreme Court addressed this conflict in California v. 
Greenwood, where a search warrant was issued based on evidence 
obtained from trash that the defendant had placed outside the curtilage 
for removal.51  While the Court upheld the warrant, it rejected the 
theory that the search of the trash was proper solely because the trash 
had been abandoned,52 instead holding that trash was not protected by 
the Fourth Amendment because there could be no objective 
expectation of privacy—society would not consider it reasonable to 
have a subjective expectation of privacy in trash.53  The Court noted 
that its conclusion was justified because “[i]t is common knowledge 
that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are 
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other 
members of the public”; the voluntary surrender of trash to a third 
party (the garbage collector) renounces control over the property; and 
the police need not avert their eyes from what is readily accessible to 
the public and a third party.54 
A contemporary review of the case summarizes its import: 
 
50 For a compilation of cases reflecting the struggle, see LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 
2.6(c). 
51 486 U.S. 35, 38 (1988).  For an analysis of Greenwood and cases involving trash, see 
Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Searches and Seizures: Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in Contents of Garbage or Trash Receptacle, 62 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998).  For a 
detailed analysis of Greenwood, critical of the decision, see Herdrich, supra note 10. 
52 As a matter of general property law, abandonment of personal property relinquishes 
ownership to any subsequent finder or, by escheat, to the state.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
PROP.: ABANDONMENT § 504 (1944). 
53 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40. 
54 Id. at 40–41 (footnotes omitted).  The Greenwood Court later cited Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), for the proposition that “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”  Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Prior to . . . Katz v. United States, the [Fourth Amendment] 
extended only to unauthorized physical intrusions . . . into a 
“constitutionally protected area.”  Katz replaced this property-based 
test with an amorphous inquiry into whether the intrusion violated a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”  The new inquiry was two-
pronged, extending [Fourth Amendment] protection to those 
interests in which a person manifests a subjective expectation of 
privacy that society recognizes as objectively reasonable. . . . Last 
Term, in California v. Greenwood, the Court found an asserted 
expectation of privacy in the contents of garbage bags left for 
collection outside the curtilage to be unreasonable. . . . Greenwood 
therefore stands for the proposition that trash searches require no 
justification.55 
Greenwood’s focus on the expectation of privacy rather than 
abandonment is surprising given the Court’s repeated recognition of 
Fourth Amendment protection for closed containers regardless of 
location.56  In dissent, Justice Brennan challenged the conclusion that 
society would not recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy 
in trash, citing a local ordinance that appeared to protect the privacy 
of trash in general57 and a century of cases protecting closed 
 
55 Search and Seizure—Garbage Searches, 102 HARV. L. REV. 191, 191–99 (1988) 
(footnotes omitted). 
56 In container search cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that an 
individual has an expectation of privacy in a sealed container regardless of its nature.  See 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (stating that there is no distinction 
between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 
(1981) (upholding an expectation of privacy in green opaque plastic wrapping); Arkansas 
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) (finding an expectation of privacy in an unlocked 
suitcase); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (recognizing an expectation of 
privacy in a locked footlocker). 
57 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 45–46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The Cheektowaga, New 
York, ordinance made it “unlawful and a violation of this article for any person without 
authority from the Town to collect, pick up, remove or cause to be collected, picked up or 
removed any rubbish.”  CODE OF THE TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA, NEW YORK § 206-7(E) 
(2005).  Several states currently recognize privacy protection for trash under state 
constitutional provisions: Hawaii (State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Haw. 1985)); 
Michigan (United States v. 987 Fisher Rd., 719 F. Supp. 1396, 1406–07 (E.D. Mich. 
1989); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11); New Jersey (State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 799–804 
(N.J. 1990); N.J. CONST. art. I); New Mexico (State v. Granville, 142 P.3d 933, 944 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2006); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 10); Oregon (State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 
1049 (Or. 1988); OR. CONST. art. I, § 9); Vermont (State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90, 100 (Vt. 
1996); VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XI); and Washington (State v. Hendrickson, 917 P.2d 563, 
571 (Wash. 1996); WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7).  Indiana requires reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity before police can conduct a trash-pull and also requires the police to 
remove the garbage in the same manner as the collector.  Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 
356, 363–64 (Ind. 2005). 
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containers.58  In Justice Brennan’s view, a garbage collector should 
be treated like a bailee, whose possession of personal effects in closed 
containers does not defeat the owner’s Fourth Amendment right to 
protect the contents of the container.59 
As Gordon MacDonald has observed, 
Greenwood suggests at least three approaches to analyzing trash 
cases, but fails to indicate which it ultimately regards as controlling.  
The first . . . was an application of Katz, under which the Court 
concluded that the defendant’s privacy expectations were 
unreasonable.  Second, . . . because the defendants “knowingly 
exposed” their garbage, their privacy expectations were necessarily 
defeated.  Third, the Court, at least implicitly, endorsed a “bright 
line” test under which no privacy expectations can attach to garbage 
left outside the curtilage. . . . Two of the approaches . . .—the bright 
line and the knowing exposure tests—are inconsistent with a 
faithful application of the other approach—the Katz expectation of 
privacy test.  The bright line test depends on the property based 
concepts of abandonment and curtilage.  Katz forcefully rejected 
such property notions as controlling.”60 
The third of these approaches—the per se rule—is easiest to deal 
with.  Professor LaFave finds fault with the argument that trash is no 
longer protected simply because it has been conveyed to the trash 
collector; in his view, the conveyance “might support the conclusion 
the police can enlist the aid of the garbage hauler . . . but it hardly 
means that the police may themselves intrude.  There is no principle 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the effect that the police are 
free to do what some individual has been authorized to do.”61  Lower 
courts likewise appear troubled by a per se rule, focusing instead on 
either the public accessibility/constitutionally protected area inquiry 
or the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy inquiry.62 
 
58 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 46–48 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 822–23; Robbins, 453 U.S. 
at 427; Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762 n.9; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 
727, 733 (1877)). 
59 Id. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
60 Gordon J. MacDonald, Note, Stray Katz: Is Shredded Trash Private?, 79 CORNELL 
L. REV. 452, 469 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
61 LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 2.6(c) (footnotes omitted).  He further notes: “In coming 
onto the curtilage and taking the trash, the collector is doing exactly what the householder 
contemplated.”  Id.  In most jurisdictions, methods of trash disposal are limited by law, 
see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 10-110(c) (LexisNexis 2002), leaving few 
options for protecting trash from searches. 
62 United States v. Segura-Baltazar, 448 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006) (no bright-
line rule for trash search cases); United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 
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Courts applying the “constitutionally protected area” test focus on 
whether trash placed at a curbside is abandoned and therefore not 
within the constitutionally protected area of the home.63  At least one 
court has concluded, in the context of a civil dispute over ownership 
of trash, that disposal of trash abandons neither the trash itself nor the 
expectation of privacy with respect to its contents.  Sharpe v. Turley 
involved the ownership of documents produced in an earlier case.64  
In that case, plaintiff’s attorney (Turley) had subpoenaed documents 
that a nonparty (Sharpe) had taken from the defendant’s trash 
dumpster.65  At the conclusion of the case, Turley turned the 
documents over to the defendant rather than returning them to Sharpe, 
and Sharpe sued, arguing that the documents had been abandoned by 
the defendant and therefore Sharpe owned them.66  The court granted 
summary judgment for Turley, holding that the documents had not 
been abandoned and noting that the dumpster was on the defendant’s 
property and the defendant had contracted with a private party to 
convey trash from the dumpster to a private landfill.67  This control 
indicated that the defendant had not intended to abandon the trash.68 
Courts applying the “expectation of privacy” test focus on whether 
one could have an expectation of privacy in trash that has been left by 
the curb.  Some state courts have found that the reasonableness of an 
expectation of privacy is enhanced by ordinances that prohibit 
 
1991) (expectation of privacy must be evaluated notwithstanding intent to convey the 
garbage to the garbage collector).  Some cases appear to combine the two analyses, finding 
that placing trash out for collection is abandonment and therefore inconsistent with an 
expectation of privacy.  See, e.g., United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972); Winbush, supra note 
51. (“The vast majority of courts have ruled that when garbage is located in a place 
accessible to the public, the individual who placed that garbage for collection either 
abandoned it or has no reasonable expectation of privacy therein, thus rendering any 
search and seizure of that trash lawful.”). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that garbage placed outside for collection is abandoned property); Vahalik, 606 F.2d at 101 
(holding that placing garbage out for collection is abandonment, which terminates any 
reasonable expectation of privacy); Mustone, 469 F.2d at 972 (expectation of privacy 
inconsistent with abandonment).  The concept of protected areas may be traced back to 
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
64 191 S.W.3d 362, 364 (Tex. App. 2006). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 366–67. 
67 Id. at 368. 
68 Id.  
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interference with trash containers,69 even though this argument was 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Greenwood.70  Some courts simply 
reject the argument that merely intending to convey the garbage to the 
trash collector is enough to defeat an expectation of privacy,71 while 
others find that placing trash by the curb indicates intent to surrender 
privacy even in the face of clear efforts to prevent disclosure.  In 
United States v. Kramer, the Seventh Circuit sustained an inside-the-
curtilage search by holding that the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment does not extend to discarded garbage: 
Of course people sometimes do not want others to see things—e.g., 
magazines, financial records, correspondence, doctor bills—that 
they sometimes throw away.  But people can easily prevent this by 
destroying what they want to keep secret before they discard it, or 
by not discarding it.  Defendant could have burned or shredded his 
drug records before he discarded them or kept them hidden 
somewhere inside his house.72 
Many commentators likewise assumed that actions such as 
shredding would invoke Fourth Amendment protection against 
warrantless searches of trash, and several courts have based rulings 
upholding warrantless searches of trash on the argument that one 
wishing to preserve privacy could have shredded documents prior to 
disposing of them.73 
However widely held, this assumption that shredding protects trash 
from warrantless searches is not the law and, in fact, has been rejected 
by the one circuit court that has ruled on the issue.  In United States v. 
 
69 See, e.g., State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 805 (N.J. 1990) (regulations against 
garbage picking support expectation that garbage will remain private).  But see Rikard v. 
State, 123 S.W.3d 114, 121 (Ark. 2003) (city ordinances against garbage rummaging were 
not created to give citizens an expectation of privacy in their garbage). 
70 See supra notes 51–59 and accompanying text. 
71 See, e.g., United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The 
Greenwood Court did not base its decision solely upon the conveyance of the garbage to 
the collector.”).  Of course, once actually conveyed to the garbage collector, trash would 
lose any privacy protection.  See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
72 711 F.2d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
73 See, e.g., id.; United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 309 (2d Cir. 1983); State v. 
DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 753 n.19 (Conn. 1993).  More generally, in distinguishing 
discarded trash from cord blood stem cells, one commentator noted, “If the owner of the 
article, item, or material did not want it to be accessible to others, he or she could burn, 
shred, or dispose of the trash in any number of other ways that would render the items 
useless.”  Kimberly J. Cogdell, Saving the Leftovers: Models for Banking Cord Blood 
Stem Cells, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 229, 246 (2009). 
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Scott, the court upheld a warrantless search, seizure, and 
reconstruction of shredded documents that had been placed in the 
defendant’s trash, rejecting the argument that shredding demonstrated 
an expectation of privacy.74 
The Scott trial court found persuasive authority for a reasonable 
privacy interest in shredded documents75 and met Greenwood’s 
observation that “[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags 
left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to 
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public”76 with its own observation that “it is not ‘common 
knowledge’ that snoops and scavengers may retrieve shredded 
materials and then ‘painstakingly reconstruct’ them to learn the 
contents.”77  On appeal, the First Circuit acknowledged, “The fact 
that the abandoned property was partially destroyed by shredding . . . 
constitut[ed] evidence of [Scott’s] subjective desire or hope that the 
contents be unintelligible to third parties,” but the court concluded 
that this subjective desire “does not change the fact that it is as a 
result of [Scott’s] own actions that the shredded evidence was placed 
in the public domain.”78  “[I]mplicit in the concept of abandonment is 
a renunciation of any reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
property abandoned.”79  The First Circuit concluded that Scott 
“discarded [his] garbage in an area particularly suited for public 
inspection and consumption. . . . The Fourth Amendment . . . does not 
protect appellant when a third party expends the effort and expense to 
solve the jigsaw puzzle created by shredding.”80 
As Gordon MacDonald notes, 
 
74 975 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that because the “trash [was] left for 
collection in a public place and over which its producer had relinquished possession,” the 
defendant also relinquished any expectation of privacy).  Clearly, the court must have been 
evaluating the privacy expectation from an objective perspective rather than the subjective 
intent of the defendant.  For a detailed analysis of the Scott case, see MacDonald, supra 
note 60, at 452–56. 
75 United States v. Scott, 776 F. Supp. 629, 632 (D. Mass. 1991) (citing Pleasant v. 
Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 802 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
76 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (footnotes omitted). 
77 Scott, 776 F. Supp. at 632. 
78 Scott, 975 F.2d at 929. 
79 Id. (quoting United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972)). 
80 Id. at 930 (“At most, appellant’s actions made it likely that most third parties would 
decline to reconstitute the shredded remnants into a legible whole.”); see also Cogdell, 
supra note 73. 
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The [court] was onto the right idea—that there are affirmative 
privacy-seeking steps to protect an individual’s interests even under 
an abandonment analysis.  Unfortunately, the court failed to carry 
its reasoning to its logical conclusion.  It is hard to conceive what 
act, beyond “mere” shredding, would evince an intent to retain 
privacy.81 
III 
IMMANENT TRASH, DISPOSAL IN GENERAL, AND CYBERTRASH 
It is tempting to translate the trash cases into other areas where 
property is discarded.  The appeal is obvious, if superficial: all of the 
cases deal with the consequences of a decision to dispose of property.  
The natural temptation to import the physical trash rules into the law 
of cybertrash is amplified by the choice of a trash can as the icon for 
file deletion in the ubiquitous Apple and Microsoft Windows 
operating systems.  Implicit in the argument for portability is the 
assumption that the disposal decision is the same in all cases.  To 
determine whether the physical trash cases appropriately translate to 
cybertrash, it is helpful to analyze, as potential models, other areas 
where the translation has been attempted, approaching the ultimate 
question of the degree of protection afforded cybertrash by first 
looking at how the degree of protection for discarded material in 
general is determined, using the examples of immanent trash, 
wastewater, and shed genetic material.  With that background, it will 
be possible to define trash in a relevant way and use that definition to 
develop a generalized rule and apply it to cybertrash.  As discussed 
below,82 the result is a dual rule, and one that separates cybertrash 
from the other forms of disposal. 
A.  Potential Models and Problems in Translation 
1.  Immanent Trash 
As discussed in detail above, the degree of protection afforded to 
trash is unsettled and still in search of a clear theoretical basis.  
Commentators,83 as well as the Greenwood Court itself,84 disagree on 
 
81 MacDonald, supra note 60, at 488. 
82 See infra Part III.B. 
83 Compare Cogdell, supra note 73, at 245–46 (“Presumably, if one throws something 
in the trash, the nature of its content is open to the public.”), with Hope Lynne Karp, Note, 
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the intent involved in disposal of trash, and the requisite level of 
intent may well have changed over time.  Greenwood would have 
been an uncontroversial decision had the case arisen in the prior 
century.  As Professor Strasser notes, 
[B]efore the twentieth century . . . [o]bjects of no use to adults 
became playthings for children.  Broken or worn-out things could 
be brought back to their makers, fixed by somebody handy, or taken 
to people who specialized in repairs . . . items beyond repair might 
be dismantled, their parts reused or sold to junk men.  This trade in 
used goods amounted to a system for reuse and recycling . . . 
scavenging was essential to that system, a chore and a common 
pastime for poor children, who foraged for shreds of canvas or bits 
of metal on the docks, for coal on the railroad tracks, and for bottles 
and food on the streets and in the alleys.85 
This system remained in place until the turn of the century, when 
municipal sanitation workers did away with the need for “swill 
children.”86  Thus, it would have been unsurprising to conclude that 
there was no expectation of privacy in trash in the nineteenth 
century—the norm was that disposal of trash was intended to 
surrender ownership to anyone who wanted to take possession.  The 
development of a system of public garbage collection and disposal did 
not begin in the United States until the late-nineteenth century,87 and 
as late as 1891 Scientific American reported, “There is probably not a 
city of any size in the United States where the disposal of wastes is 
satisfactory.”88  However, by 1984,89 the norm was not only 
formalized governmental pickup of trash, but in many states and 
 
Trash: A Matter of Privacy?, 20 PACE L. REV. 541, 547 (2000) (“[The information 
contained in trash] is conveyed to the garbage collector for the purpose of eliminating it 
from one’s life—forever.”). 
84 Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35–45 (1988), with id. at 45–56 
(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
85 SUSAN STRASSER, WASTE AND WANT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRASH 12, 13 (1998). 
86 Id. at 13. 
87 Martin V. Melosi, GARBAGE IN THE CITIES: REFUSE, REFORM, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 23 (rev. ed. 2005). 
88 Disposal of Refuse in American Cities, SCI. AM., Aug. 29, 1891, at 136. 
89 The search of trash in Greenwood took place in April 1984, although the case did not 
reach the Supreme Court until 1988.  Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37. 
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municipalities, laws that forbade third parties to interfere with this 
governmental function.90 
Cybertrash has no such history.  There was never a time when 
owners of electronic files expected that others might take possession 
of the files uninvited. 
2.  Wastewater 
Wastewater is a broad category of material that is discarded.  A 
thread of search and seizure cases involving wastewater may help 
clarify the underlying principles of disposal cases in general. 
In Riverdale Mills v. Pimpare, Riverdale Mills discharged 
wastewater into a municipal sewer system after pretreatment in its 
private, on-site, treatment system.91  The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) took samples from a manhole located in a public street 
between the private treatment system and the municipal system.92  
Using reasoning similar to the argument that trash left at the curb for 
pickup is no longer private, the court held that the EPA’s sampling 
did not violate Riverdale Mills’ Fourth Amendment rights because the 
wastewater had left Riverdale Mills’ property and was “irretrievably” 
flowing into the public sewer, where any member of the public could 
sample it.93 
In United States v. Spain, the EPA sampled at the location where 
Crown Chemical’s sewer lines joined the public sewer system.94  The 
court held that this sampling did not constitute a search, citing 
Riverdale and noting that “the facts of this case are even more 
compelling . . . because the EPA tested Crown’s wastewater at the 
exact point where that wastewater became public property.”95 
In United States v. Hajduk, the court applied the Riverdale 
principle to hold that samples taken beyond the discharger’s property 
did not require a warrant, but those taken on the discharger’s property 
did, distinguishing between locations where the discharger had the 
 
90 Elizabeth Gibson, Law Closes in on Bexley’s Trash Man, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2009/01/19/trash_man.ART 
_ART_ 01-19-09_B1_21CJ3BA.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
91 392 F.3d 55, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2004). 
92 Id. at 58. 
93 Id. at 64. 
94 515 F. Supp. 2d 860, 864 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
95 Id. at 868. 
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power to prevent flow to the public sewer and those where it did 
not.96 
These cases appear to draw a line at the point where the waste 
stream has been irrevocably committed to reaching an area from 
which the public cannot be excluded.  If this is the guiding principle, 
then cybertrash should be safe.  Notwithstanding its location beyond 
the physical boundary of the house, and notwithstanding its 
accessibility by third parties, it is not accessible to the public. 
3.  Shed DNA 
If the term “discarded” is viewed broadly, then another category of 
routinely discarded material is DNA that is constantly shed in the 
form of hair and skin cells.  “[W]e can’t go anywhere . . . without 
leaving a bread-crumb trail of identifying DNA matter.”97  Judge 
Kozinski, dissenting in United States v. Kincade, warned, “If we have 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in such bodily material, what 
possible impediment can there be to having the government collect 
what we leave behind, extract its DNA signature and enhance CODIS 
to include everyone?”98  Yet DNA is routinely collected from crime 
scenes without raising Fourth Amendment issues, and collecting this 
“abandoned” DNA has been held not to require a warrant.99  Courts 
have also approved warrantless collection of DNA samples obtained 
by police who retrieved them from items deliberately given to 
suspects.100 
Whether there is a general rule equating shed DNA with trash (and 
therefore exposing it to warrantless search and seizure) is as yet 
undecided.  A number of states have enacted legislation protecting 
DNA as property,101 but in the absence of specific legislation, the law 
 
96 396 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1226–27 (D. Colo. 2005). 
97 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
98 Id. 
99 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); Kincade, 370 F.3d at 819; State v. 
Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 556–57 (La. 1986). 
100 See People v. Ayler, 799 N.Y.S.2d 162, *5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (denying motion 
to suppress evidence obtained from DNA on cigarettes offered to defendant during a 
police interview); Richard Willing, Police Dupe Suspects into Giving up DNA, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, at A3; Richard Willing, As Police Rely More on DNA, States Take 
a Closer Look, USA TODAY, June 6, 2000, at 1A. 
101 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2004) (“[A] DNA sample and the results of a 
DNA analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of the person sampled 
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of ownership and control of DNA is unsettled.  A federal district court 
dismissed a complaint claiming ownership of tissue that had been 
donated for research purposes but then used for additional 
commercial purposes, because “the property right in blood and tissue 
samples also evaporates once the sample is voluntarily given to a 
third party.”102 
In arguing for restrictions on the collection of abandoned DNA, 
Elizabeth Joh observes that “legal discussion is hampered by a 
misleading analogy between abandoned DNA and garbage” and that 
analysis of rights in DNA “should address the question of whether 
more appropriate analogies to abandoned DNA exist other than 
trash.”103  Joh notes an important distinction: 
Courts may readily find that criminals have clearly intended to 
renounce all privacy claims to bags containing illegal firearms or to 
packages of drug paraphernalia when fleeing the police, but we 
hardly have a realistic choice in shedding DNA.  One can shred 
private papers or burn garbage so that no one may ever delve into 
them, but leaving DNA in public places cannot be avoided.104 
Such an argument would apply to cybertrash as well.  It is 
impossible to create electronic files without leaving traces—if not in 
public places, at least in places where the owner does not maintain 
absolute control.  Files created in cyberspace are typically subject to 
backup procedures that are beyond the owner’s control and which 
create copies that persist for a significant period of time after the 
owner deletes the original.105 
 
or analyzed.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (2009) (“Genetic information is the 
unique property of the individual to whom the information pertains.”); FLA. STAT. § 
760.40(2)(a) (2009) (“[Genetic testing results] are the exclusive property of the person 
tested.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (1995) (“Genetic information is the unique 
property of the individual tested.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023(E) (2009) (describing 
genetic information as “property” of the person tested); OR. REV. STAT. 192.537(1) (2009) 
(“[A]n individual’s genetic information and DNA sample are private and must be 
protected, and an individual has a right to the protection of that privacy.”). 
102 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1075 
(S.D. Fla. 2003). 
103 Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and 
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857, 860, 862 (2006). 
104 Id. at 867 (footnote omitted). 
105 For an example of the propagation of backup copies and the time taken to remove 
them, see Rajen Sheth, Disaster Recovery by Google, OFFICIAL GOOGLE ENTERPRISE 
BLOG (Mar. 4, 2010), http://googleenterprise.blogspot.com/2010/03/disaster-recovery-by  
-google.html, which outlines Google’s backup procedures. 
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4.  Cybertrash 
A troubling argument by analogy to physical trash runs as follows:  
Imagine that an individual receives an e-mail and, as many 
individuals do, prints a copy.  The next day, the individual deletes the 
e-mail and places the printout in the trash can and places the trash can 
at the curb for disposal by the municipal trash collector.  Under 
Greenwood, the printout may be retrieved without a warrant.  Why, 
the argument would continue, should a warrant be required for one 
form of trash but not the other? 
One subissue can be disposed of easily.  Storage of the deleted file 
at a common facility (the individual’s e-mail provider or Internet 
service provider) should be irrelevant.  Courts have recognized that 
Fourth Amendment protection can exist in common areas such as 
those found within apartment complexes, hotels, and motels.106 
Resolving the main issue, however, requires analysis of the nature 
of cybertrash.  Cybertrash is data—files, applications, and 
communications—created in cyberspace and then deleted.  The 
volume of cyberspace data has increased dramatically with the 
introduction of the concept of “cloud computing”: applications and 
data stored online and accessible remotely on what is known as a 
cloud platform.107  Because the applications and data are stored 
online, a user can access them from anywhere with an Internet 
connection.  Cloud platforms are offered by IBM,108 Google,109 and 
Microsoft,110 among others.111 
 
106 See, e.g., United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716–17 (9th Cir. 1976) (common 
hallway of an apartment building); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 
1976) (common area of an apartment building); Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 
(5th Cir. 1974) (fenced yard of a multiunit apartment building).  But see United States v. 
Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255–56 (2d Cir. 1985) (no expectation of privacy in common 
hallway or lobby of apartment building). 
107 Rebooting Their Systems, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 2011, at 73, 73. 
108 IBMSmartCloud, IBM, http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/cloud/index.html (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
109 Kate Greene, Google’s Cloud Looms Large, TECH. REV. (Dec. 3, 2007), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/Biztech/19785/?a=f (last visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
110 Cloud Power, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud/default.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
111 See, e.g., Alex Williams, A Bursting Market: Cisco Building APIs for Cloud 
Infrastructure Automation, READWRITE, (Mar. 8, 2011, 8:45 AM), http://www 
.readwriteweb.com/cloud/2011/03/cisco-building-apis-for-cloud.php. 
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When data is placed on a cloud platform, it is typically maintained 
by a third party, with the maintenance including storage at mirror sites 
and regular backups of the data to protect against loss.112  The owner 
of the data can remotely issue an instruction to delete the data, but 
deletion does not result in destruction.113  Initially, it is merely an 
instruction to make the physical space on which the data is stored 
available for reuse, and until the space is reused, the data remains 
intact.114  Furthermore, servers do not typically delete the files on 
backups, but rather periodically recycle the backup media.115  Again, 
until the media is actually reused, the data remains intact.116 
This leads to a further complication when dealing with cybertrash: 
the question of when and where cybertrash disposal takes place.  
Cybertrash is not physically stored at the owner’s location, and while 
the owner may retain legal control over the information, it is control 
by virtue of contractual agreements and passwords.117  Furthermore, 
the entity that has physical control over the facilities where the 
information is stored typically will maintain mirror sites against the 
possibility of power failures, fires, or other disasters and make backup 
copies that are stored off-site.118  The owner’s instruction to delete a 
 
112 Rebooting Their Systems, supra note 107. 
113 See SIMSON GARFINKEL, GENE SPAFFORD & ALAN SCHWARTZ, PRACTICAL UNIX 
AND INTERNET SECURITY 678 (3d ed. 2003) (“When a file is deleted, the contents are not 
immediately overwritten.  Instead, the data records are added back into the freelist on disk.  
If they are not reused yet . . . you can still read the contents.”).  For an example of a cloud 
storage and backup policy, see the Google policy, supra note 105. 
114 Deleted Files Can Be Recovered, AKDART.COM, http://www.akdart.com/priv9.html 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
115 Id. 
116 See, e.g., id. 
117 The physical facility operates as the agent for the owner of the data and would have 
a fiduciary duty to follow the owner’s instructions as to disposal.  Mere encryption has 
been held insufficient to establish the requisite expectation of privacy to invoke Fourth 
Amendment protection, and the refusal to recognize shredding as evidencing a sufficient 
expectation of privacy in United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1992), would 
provide a powerful analogy to support warrantless decryption or cracking of passwords.  
See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. 
118 See GARFINKEL, SPAFFORD & SCHWARTZ, supra note 113, at 551–52. 
It may take a week or a month to realize that a file has been deleted.  Therefore, 
you should keep some backup tapes for a week, some for a month, and some for 
several months.  Many organizations make yearly or quarterly backups that they 
archive indefinitely.  After all, tape is cheap.  Some organizations decide to keep 
their yearly or biannual backups ‘forever’—it’s a small investment in the event 
that they should ever be needed again.  
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file must propagate through this system to affect all of these 
locations.119 
To understand why, notwithstanding the appeal of a single rule for 
all discarded property, cybertrash rules should not be the same as 
immanent trash rules requires exploration of a seemingly trivial 
question: What is trash? 
B.  What Is Trash? 
Greenwood and its progeny do not attempt to define trash—they 
begin their analysis with the proposition that the items of interest are 
“trash” and then analyze where the trash was left and what 
expectations the prior owner and society in general might have had 
regarding its disposition.  In the immanent world, the lack of 
definition is unimportant, and intuitive definitions are quite 
satisfactory and rarely raise issues.  As valuable property moves from 
the tangible world to the intangible, and especially as intangible 
property moves from local embodiments120 to the “cloud,” the 
definition of trash and the rights of “trashholders” become important. 
For something that is so ubiquitous, trash is remarkably undefined.  
There is no absolute right to create trash.  The right must arise as 
inherent in the notion of property, which includes the right of 
alienation.  However, neither the right to destroy121 nor the right to 
 
Id.; see also Google policy, supra note 105. 
119 Even files on one’s own computer may not be under the owner’s complete control, 
depending on the operating system.  Most operating systems can be set to create automatic 
backup files, and most operating systems create system files that are hidden from the user 
and carry out functions such as creating page files to speed up access and display or 
creating system images that are stored on the hard drive as “hibernate” files when system 
power falls below a specified level.  Many programs also automatically create files that 
facilitate their functioning without direct request by the user—for example, Internet 
cookies. 
120 Examples of local tangible embodiments of intangible property include data saved 
on a disk drive and music stored on a CD or MP3 player.  The tangible embodiment and 
the intangible property (in this case a copyright) are distinct properties.  See generally 17 
U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
121 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) (prohibiting the destruction of certain works 
of art). 
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dispose of122 are absolute attributes of physical property, even in the 
absence of third-party rights.123 
There are several ways to categorize trash: biodegradable or not, 
recyclable or not, usable or not, hazardous or not.  In the physical 
world, these categories matter, and limitations on how trash may be 
disposed of are imposed by statute based on these distinctions.124  In 
the nonphysical world of cybertrash, only one of these distinctions 
matters.  All cybertrash is biodegradable, recyclable, and 
nonhazardous.  The critical division is between cybertrash that might 
be used by others and that which might not.  To understand why this 
distinction matters in cyberspace, consider the reasons that people 
dispose of trash. 
Conceptually, there are two broad categories of trash disposal: 
disposal that is meant merely to part with ownership and possession, 
and disposal that is meant to destroy the discarded trash.  While Katz 
holds that the trash owner’s subjective intent is insufficient to invoke 
Fourth Amendment protection, that intent is still relevant.  In the 
physical world it is relevant because Katz requires a subjective intent 
to maintain privacy in addition to an expectation of privacy that 
society deems objectively reasonable;125 in the cyber world, it is 
determinative. 
1.  Trash as a Surrender of Ownership 
An example of trash disposal falling into the “surrender” category 
would be a discarded old newspaper.  The owner of the old 
newspaper finds no further value in the property and simply wants to 
part with possession and, in the process of doing so, is also willing to 
part with ownership—the owner does not care if someone else sees 
value in the discarded newspaper and wishes to take possession and 
ownership.  Similarly, if a lamp breaks and the owner does not value 
it sufficiently to repair it, and instead places it by the curb for trash 
pickup, the owner typically would not object if a passerby saw 
 
122 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006) (prohibiting disposal of certain substances 
without a permit and compliance with government-set requirements). 
123 The existence of third-party rights can, of course, limit the right to destroy or 
dispose of property that one owns.  Examples of categories of third-party rights are liens, 
co-ownerships, and leases. 
124 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006). 
125 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  See generally supra Part I.C.; 
Couillard, supra note 2. 
OPPENHEIMER 10/28/2011  10:33 AM 
26 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 1 
sufficient value in the broken lamp and took possession and 
ownership in order to repair it.  Case law is consistent with this 
general presumption and generally treats trash as abandoned property 
open to appropriation by others (including government 
investigators),126 either by virtue of abandonment under the trespass 
theory127 or surrender under the expectation of privacy theory.128 
As discussed above, voluntarily conveying information to a third 
party surrenders the right to claim Fourth Amendment protection for 
the information.129  While Justice Brennan criticized reliance on 
abandonment as a rationale for depriving trash of Fourth Amendment 
protection, it is one of the rationales offered by the Court in 
California v. Greenwood,130 and if cybertrash is viewed as a disposal 
of ownership and possession, it is a rationale that would lead to the 
conclusion that cybertrash may be searched without a warrant. 
2.  Trash as an Instruction to Destroy 
There is a second category of disposal, where the intent is not to 
release possession and ownership but rather to destroy the discarded 
item so that no one may own it.  Disposal of personal documents 
would usually fall into this category. 
The wastewater cases and, inherently, the physical trash cases, 
highlight an important second aspect of disposal: destruction of the 
link between the disposed property and its former owner.  The 
wastewater cases illustrate one reason why it is important: when the 
link is broken, so is the evidentiary value of the property.  Likewise, 
 
126 See, e.g., United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1111–12 (7th Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Walker, 624 F. Supp. 99, 101–02 (D. Md. 1985); Rikard v. State, 123 S.W.3d 
114, 119–20 (Ark. 2003); People v. Rooney, 221 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53–54 (1985); People v. 
Huddleston, 347 N.E.2d 76, 80–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); State v. Sampson, 765 A.2d 629, 
635 (Md. 2001). 
127 See supra Part I.B. 
128 See supra Part I.C. 
129 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114–15 (1984) (package delivered to a 
private carrier); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) (telephone numbers 
called); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (bank records); United States v. 
Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Or. 2006) (electricity records); see also supra 
notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
130 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 49 n.2 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
Justice Brennan noted, “Of 11 Federal Court of Appeals cases cited by the Court . . . 7 rely 
entirely or almost entirely on an abandonment theory that . . . the Court has discredited.”  
Id. (citations omitted); see also Sampson, 765 A.2d at 634 (noting that the trash cases are 
based less on the property concept of abandonment than on public accessibility). 
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the reason for seizing trash before it is mixed with others’ trash is to 
preserve its evidentiary link to a particular individual or individuals. 
Thus, where the intent associated with disposal is to destroy, it may 
evidence either the intent to physically destroy or simply the intent to 
destroy the one-to-one link between the physical object and its owner.  
Either is evidence of intent to maintain privacy and therefore satisfies 
Katz and the first prong of the Greenwood test. 
IV 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF CYBERTRASH 
A.  Encryption and the Curtilage 
There are two arguments in favor of protection of deleted files that, 
under current theory, do not appear to be sufficient to establish Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
One appealing argument is that the information is private.131  
Transmission from and to the owner is typically encrypted.132  The 
argument has even been accepted in dissent that there is a general 
expectation of privacy in trash in general.133  However, at least under 
the current “objective expectation of privacy” standard, this argument 
would not be sufficient.  Even shredding trash has been held 
 
131 In most cases the information would meet the Uniform Trade Secrets Act definition 
of trade secret information.  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).  
The Act provides that a trade secret is created when confidential information is subject to 
reasonable steps to protect its confidentiality.  Id.  Password protection and encryption, in 
most cases, are considered reasonable steps to maintain confidentiality.  See, e.g., Optos, 
Inc. v. Topcon Med. Sys., Inc., No. 10-12016-DJC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22263, at *52–
53 (D. Mass. 2011); I-Systems, Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. 01-1951, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6001, at *46–47 (D. Minn. 2004). 
132 Sensitive information may be transferred using SSL (secure socket layer) or SHTTP 
(secure HTTP) protocols.  Data may also be encrypted prior to transmission using widely 
available encryption software. 
133 See State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 757–58 (Conn. 1993) (Katz, J., dissenting).  
Justice Katz argued, 
The majority suggests . . . that it is also reasonable for society to expect citizens 
to take affirmative steps—such as shredding or destroying—to hide garbage that 
they wish to keep private.  How many of us, as Connecticut residents, feel the 
need to shred or destroy personal information before discarding it in order to 
protect its confidentiality?  The very fact that Connecticut residents customarily 
discard highly personal and typically confidential information into their garbage 
without first shredding or destroying it, is a strong indication that they expect 
these items to remain private. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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insufficient to establish an objective expectation of privacy,134 and 
while encryption might delay interpretation of the data,135 it does not 
suffice to prevent its seizure and attempt to interpret it.136 
A second appealing approach is to update the definition of the 
curtilage so as to consider data stored off-site but accessible through 
the Internet as part of the area immediately surrounding the home, in 
effect bringing the ISP within the curtilage.137  This approach was at 
least implicitly rejected in Smith v. Maryland.138  While the focus of 
the case was on the absence of an expectation of privacy in 
information (the telephone numbers dialed by the defendant) 
conveyed to a third party (the phone company),139 the information 
was being sent over equipment that at least in part was located in the 
defendant’s home and all of which was connected to the defendant’s 
home.  In United States v. Forrester, a federal circuit court relied on 
 
134 See United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1992). 
135 Shredding certainly must have delayed interpretation of the documents seized in 
Scott.  See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
136 Kerr, supra note 1, at 532 (traditional view that encryption does not create 
reasonable expectation of privacy applies to the Internet).  David Couillard argues that 
Kerr misses the point: encryption should not be analogized to a physical lock and key but 
rather to opacity.  Couillard, supra note 2, at 2226. 
Hypothetically, if a briefcase is locked with a combination lock, the government 
could attempt to guess the combination until the briefcase unlocked; but because 
the briefcase is opaque, there is still a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
unlocked container.  In the context of virtual containers in the cloud, however, 
encryption is not simply a virtual lock and key; it is virtual opacity. 
Id.  More generally, attempts to hide information have been held insufficient in several 
aerial surveillance cases where the information was successfully hidden from ground-level 
view.  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (visible by helicopter); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 214 (1986) (visible by plane flying above a yard 
enclosed by a ten-foot fence). 
137 See Couillard, supra note 2; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 444–45 
(1928) (protecting the new technology of personal telephone conversations).  Although 
decided after Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), Oliver v. United States sets forth 
the traditional understanding of curtilage: “the area around the home to which the activity 
of home life extends.”  466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984).  Subsequently, the Court defined 
the curtilage as the area “so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under 
the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.”  United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 
294, 301 (1987).  As discussed above, the Dunn definition is circular and does not compel 
a different result. 
138 See 442 U.S. 735. 
139 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744  (“[P]etitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to 
the telephone company . . . . In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company 
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”). 
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Smith to distinguish between the address fields in e-mails and the 
content of e-mail messages, holding that e-mailers “have no 
expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages . . . 
because they should know that this information is provided to and 
used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing 
the routing of information.”140  These cases may be seen as 
applications of the more general principal announced in Horton v. 
California: there is a distinction between a container and its contents, 
and exposure of the container to the public does not surrender the 
privacy of the contents.141 
These cases may provide support for an argument establishing an 
expectation of privacy, but they appear to reject the concept of an 
expanded curtilage.  Furthermore, basing Fourth Amendment 
protection on a redefinition of curtilage would require a retreat from 
the Katz expectation of privacy theory to the earlier physical trespass 
theory. 
B.  The Presumption of Destruction and Objective Expectations 
While the relatively low percentage of personal documents in 
physical trash may support Greenwood’s conclusion that the default 
with respect to the physical world is an intent to—or at least 
indifference to—transfer, it is likely that the reverse is true in 
cyberspace.  There, most cybertrash consists of files containing 
personal or private information, so the reasonable conclusion would 
be that the default assumption should be that disposal reflects an 
intent to destroy.  For example, the default objective of “trashing” e-
mails and files is more likely to be a desire to destroy rather than 
abandon.  The reasons are simple: cyberproperty takes little physical 
space, so the incentive to dispose of it to make room is less pressing 
than with physical property.  Cyberproperty does not decay, so the 
incentive to dispose of it to avoid having it spoil is not present.  The 
reason for deleting a file is normally to make it disappear, not to 
transfer ownership, much less to make it available to the general 
public, and even less to transfer ownership to a third party who could 
then deny access to the original owner.142 
 
140 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). 
141 496 U.S. 128, 141 n.11 (1990) (mere seizure of container does not of itself authorize 
opening it without a warrant). 
142 See, e.g., Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211, 222 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980). 
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It was therefore reasonable for the Katz Court to impose the dual 
requirements of subjective expectation of privacy and objective 
societal recognition of the claim to privacy, because there were two 
possible answers to the inquiry, what did the owner expect?  It was 
defensible for the Greenwood Court to conclude that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore no Fourth 
Amendment protection, with respect to physical trash, because it was 
possible to conclude that trash left unprotected in the open might not 
be considered private.  In a world where there can be no question as 
to expectations and no ambiguity as to intent, neither result could be 
defended.  The cyberworld is such a world. 
The ambiguity of immanent trash disposal does not arise with 
respect to cybertrash.  One would not expect “animals, small children 
and scavengers” to rummage through cybertrash in search of 
something edible or reusable.  It is hard to imagine that an owner’s 
choice to delete information was meant to release the information for 
possible reuse by someone else—the intent is always to make the 
information disappear.143 
Nor could the second prong of the two-part test announced in Katz 
and apparently the critical inquiry regarding Fourth Amendment 
protection for trash—the societal acceptance of an expectation of 
privacy—be in doubt.  Few issues in cyberspace have attracted as 
much attention as the risk of identity theft144 and the related issue of 
government access to private information.145  Protection against 
spyware is a billion-dollar-a-year industry; hundreds of articles appear 
annually in the popular press; the FTC website offers tips for avoiding 
identity theft.  If society were prepared to accept as reasonable an 
expectation of privacy in anything, online personal information would 
have to be at or near the top of the list.  This concern over online 
 
143 If the intent were to make the information available for use by others, it would be e-
mailed or posted on a website, not deleted. 
144 See, e.g., Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: 
The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 61 (2011); Mark MacCarthy, Information Security Policy in the U.S. Retail 
Payments Industry, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3; Gary M. Victor, Identity Theft, Its 
Environment and Proposals for Change, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 273 (2006). 
145 See, e.g., James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National 
Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459 (2004); Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, Free 
Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth Amendment Limits on National Security 
Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105 (2009); Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the 
Vision of the American Law Institute, Then and Now, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 145 (2008). 
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identity theft, and the resulting expectation that online transactions 
remain private, distinguishes cybertrash from Greenwood.  Given the 
scope of concern146 and resulting federal legislation,147 it would be 
difficult to argue that society did not recognize as reasonable an 
expectation of privacy in electronic records and an expectation that 
deleting such records would result in continued privacy. 
CONCLUSION: PROTECTING CYBERTRASH 
The entire problem of the status of cybertrash may have arisen 
simply because some unnamed software engineer on Apple’s Lisa 
development project decided to use a stylized trash can as the GUI 
symbol for “deleted files,”148 but it is more likely that, regardless of 
the name chosen for the area in which deleted files are stored, the 
analogy to physical trash would have been advanced eventually.  In 
both the physical and cyber cases, the intent is to part with ownership 
or control of something.  There are, however, two critical distinctions 
that should make the application of the immanent trash decisions to 
cybertrash lead to a conclusion that Fourth Amendment protections 
apply: there is no ambiguity in the action of deleting a file, and there 
is no question about the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy 
in private files.149 
Together, these distinctions should place deleted electronic 
information squarely in the protected category under Greenwood and 
therefore subject to the same Fourth Amendment protections as other 
 
146 See, e.g., Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/info/identity-theft/ 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011); Stephanie Armour, Employment Records Prove Ripe Source 
for Identity Theft, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/money 
/workplace/2003-01-23-idtheft-cover_x.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2011); see also IDENTITY 
THEFT NEWS ARTICLES, http://ssnfraudinfo.blogspot.com/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
147 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (2006). 
148 As discussed above, even the term “delete” does not mean “dispose of”—it means 
mark the physical space on which the information is stored as available for reuse.  The 
information is not disposed of until space is needed and the information is overwritten.  
This so-called slack space can be specifically selected and overwritten by specialized 
programs, known as file scrubbers, that offer various levels of destruction of the 
underlying data.  These can be used on systems the owner of the information controls but 
not on systems under a third party’s control. 
149 A different result would of course be expected where the expectation of privacy was 
surrendered, as in the case of published files, such as those posted on Facebook or a 
similar website or those e-mailed to third parties.  Nonconfidential disclosure to a third 
party surrenders the claim to an expectation of privacy.  See supra notes 44–47 and 
accompanying text. 
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personal data.  The result is constitutionally compelled and does not 
depend on any statute.  Thus, there is no need for a new statute to 
extend privacy protection to cybertrash, and it is beyond Congress’ 
power to diminish this protection. 
There are, however, steps that are advisable to protect cybertrash.  
There is a theoretical risk of a bootstrap trap—merely announcing that 
there is no privacy in cybertrash would allow a government agency to 
argue that there could thereafter be no objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy based on the rationale in Greenwood.  Justice 
Brennan’s conjecture that “members of our society will be shocked to 
learn that the Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, deems 
unreasonable our expectation that the aspects of our private lives that 
are concealed safely in a trash bag will not become public”150 was the 
minority view.  This argument would, however, completely destroy 
the Fourth Amendment.  If accepted, it would allow the government 
to search any location simply by announcing ahead of time that it 
intended to do so. 
The abandonment theory still seems viable, at least in the context 
of DNA.151  Therefore, care must be taken to do nothing that might be 
construed as making the information public or abandoning deleted 
files. 
Thus, files posted in public places—Facebook, LinkedIn, company 
websites, and the like—do not obtain protection by being deleted.  A 
more subtle risk may be posed by form contracts with ISPs, websites, 
e-mail services, or employers that purport to transfer ownership of 
some or all of the rights in the files.  Because information shared with 
a third party who is not under a duty of confidentiality surrenders the 
expectation of privacy necessary to assert Fourth Amendment 
protection,152 these contracts may terminate Fourth Amendment 
rights in any files they cover, and again, the protection is not restored 
by virtue of deletion. 
In the absence of these or similar affirmative acts of surrender, 
cybertrash should be protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
150 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 46 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
151 See Joh, supra note 103. 
152 See sources cited supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
